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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a pervasive, yet controversial, problem. The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change defines it as
"a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is
in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time
periods."' In 1995, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) linked the increased emissions of greenhouse
gases-largely attributable to human activities such as fossil fuel use and
agriculture-to the late-twentieth century warming trend worldwide.
2
This 1995 IPCC Report confirming the human influence on climate
change catalyzed the negotiation of targets and timetables in the Kyoto
Protocol. 3
During the six months leading up to the Kyoto negotiations, Presi-
dent Clinton faced a major challenge when he tried to rally support at
home for binding reductions on GHG emissions.4 The U.S. Senate urged
the President not to support a treaty that would be so costly to the U.S.
economy, but would not include binding targets on developing coun-
tries.5 Industry protested that the Protocol would be counterproductive
because it would thwart their business interests while letting developing
countries continue to develop without mandatory GHG emissions reduc-
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 1, 31
I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
2 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT:
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, 4 (1996), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/sa(E).pdf (last visited
April 9, 2006). Greenhouse gases (GHGs) encompass carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous
oxide. The IPCC noted the following with regard to the worldwide warming trend:
For about a thousand years before the Industrial Revolution, the amount of green-
house gases in the atmosphere remained relatively constant. Since then, the concen-
tration of various greenhouse gases has increased. The amount of carbon dioxide,
for example, has increased by more than 30% since pre-industrial times and is still
increasing at an unprecented rate of an average of 0.4% per year, mainly due to the
combustion of fossil fuels and deforestation.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WORKING
GROUP I: THE SCIENTIFC BASIS (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/
wgl/044.htm (last visited April 9, 2006).
3 HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, INT'L. ENVTL. LAW AND POL'Y 626 (2d ed. 2002).
4 Id. at 627.
5 Id.
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tions as they transition to industrialized nations. 6 Despite these concerns,
the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol; however, the Bush adminis-
tration withdrew from the Protocol in 2001.
In stark contrast to this reluctance and apprehension in the United
States, the support for the Kyoto Protocol worldwide was overwhelm-
ingly strong. In December 1997, 160 countries convened in Kyoto, Ja-
pan to negotiate the text of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which places mandatory
limits on greenhouse gas emissions. 7 The Kyoto Protocol established the
first binding targets and timetables to reduce net GHG emissions for
member nations. 8 The Protocol calculates net emissions by measuring
not only GHG emissions by sources, but also removals by sinks associ-
ated with those activities. 9 A sink is "any process, activity, or mecha-
nism which removes ? greenhouse gas ... from the atmosphere."' 1
Under the Protocol, each Annex I (developed) nation negotiated a
net emissions reduction of at least 5 percent below the baseline year,
1990.11 Annex I nations must achieve these emissions reduction com-
mitments in the first reporting period 2008-2012.12 Before withdrawing
from the Protocol in 2001, the United States had agreed to a 7% reduc-
tion, while most European nations has agreed to an 8% reduction. 13
The Protocol identifies common but differentiated emissions reduc-
tion commitments for developed and developing countries. To assist na-
tions in meeting their emissions reduction commitments, the Protocol
contains flexibility mechanisms. The first such mechanism, joint imple-
mentation, allows one Annex I (developed) nation party, or their private
entities to sell reductions to another Annex I party or enterprise. 14 Sec-
ond, the Protocol permits emissions trading between Annex I nations. 15
Finally, the Protocol includes the "Clean Development Mechanism,"
which allows Annex I nations, or their private entities, to fund activities
in non-Annex I (developing) nations that result in emissions reductions. 16
6 Id.
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 1.L.M.
22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. As of this writing, 162
nations are parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
8 See id. at art. 3.
9 Id. at art. 3.3.
10 UNFCCC, supra notel, at art. 1.8.
11 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 3(1).
12 Id.
13 HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 3, at 630.
14 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 6.1.
15 Id. at art. 17.
16 Id. at art. 12.
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Once such emission reductions are certified, the Annex I nation may then
use those reductions to contribute to its own compliance.17
Not only has the United States failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
but it also has no comparable federal legislation on point. 18 Instead, its
Global Climate Change Policy calls for only modest industrial efficiency
improvements, which are significantly less ambitious than the emission
reduction targets imposed on industrialized nations under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol.19 If the United States neither ratifies the Kyoto Protocol nor
adopts comparable mandatory federal legislation, the international effort
will not achieve its goals because the United States is responsible for
approximately 25 percent of GHG emissions worldwide.20
Effective federal climate change regulation in the United States has
been thwarted because the second Bush Administration is reluctant to
recognize the problem, and therefore tends to invest in research over di-
rect regulation.21 This limited federal response to climate change, how-
ever, has prompted a broad spectrum of climate change efforts at the
state, regional, and local levels, among private and public actors. Many
states and cities have implemented a variety of laws, including
mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions, while others promote en-
ergy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources through various
incentive programs. 22 Several states are also involved in regional initia-
tives, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions, and the Western Renewable Energy
Generation Information System (WREGIS) in the western states.23 In
addition, the regulated community, prompted by the threat of possible
private litigation and the prospect of eventual mandatory federal regula-
tion, has voluntarily adopted emission reduction programs and other pos-
itive climate change measures. 24 Finally, in the past few years, plaintiffs
17 Id.
18 The McCain/Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act, which sought to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions to 2000 levels by 2010, was defeated by a vote of 55-43 in October 2003.
Climate Stewardship Act, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003).
19 Compare U.S. Global Climate Change Policy, available at http://www.state.gov/g/
oes/climate/ (last visited April 9, 2006) with Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 3(1).
20 See http://www.pewclimate.org/global.warming-basics/faq-s/faqs-policy.
21 See Brian DuBose, Compromises Key to Energy Bill, WASH TIMES, June 22, 2005, at
A4; Juliet Eilperin, Administration Shifts on Global Warming, WASH. PosT, Aug. 27, 2004, at
A19. But see Andrew Buncombe, US Insists It Is Serious on C02 as Kyoto Comes Into Force,
THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Feb. 17, 2005 (quoting spokesperson to the effect that measures by
the Bush Administration to address global warming include: investment in hydrogen fuel cell
technology, tax incentives for renewable energy, tightened fuel economy standards, and a zero
emission plan for coal-fired power plants).
22 See generally Part II. A., infra for a discussion of RGGI and WREGIS.
23 See generally Part II. B., infra.
24 See generally Part III, infra.
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have tested several legal theories, both to prompt and to halt climate
change regulatory efforts, in the federal courts.25
Part I of the Article analyzes the U.S. federal regulatory approach to
climate change. Part II explores representative state, regional, and local
attempts to combat climate change, whereas Part III describes voluntary
compliance initiatives in the regulated community to monitor and reduce
GHG emissions. Part IV focuses on federal lawsuits brought by states,
cities, and nongovernmental organizations filed against 1) the federal
government seeking to compel a mandatory climate change program or
2) the regulated community seeking to hold companies accountable for
the effects of GHG emissions.
The Article concludes that climate change litigation is a more effec-
tive tool to bring about a mandatory federal regulatory program than are
legislative efforts at the state, regional, and city levels, or voluntary ini-
tiatives within the regulated community. The best route to a mandatory
federal program is either through the pending suit to compel the EPA to
implement such a program under existing statutory authority, 26 or for the
regulated community to lobby for a mandatory federal program to ensure
consistency and predictability in conducting their business. This initia-
tive in the regulated community to go beyond mere voluntary measures
would be prompted by fear of the potential bad publicity and financially
devastating liability in private climate change litigation. 27
Until climate change litigation leads to a mandatory federal pro-
gram, these climate change lawsuits are worthwhile in their own right as
part of a broader public awareness campaign advocating the need for a
mandatory federal climate change program in the United States. Simi-
larly, the state, regional, local, and voluntary climate change regulatory
measures currently in place in the United States are valuable in the short
term, but only as a first step toward a mandatory federal climate change
program.
I. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
In 2001, the Bush administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol. 28
Worse still, although there has been a flurry of mandatory federal legisla-
25 See generally Part IV, infra.
26 See notes 190 - 201 and accompanying text discussing the Massachusetts v. EPA case,
infra.
27 See notes 202 - 223 and accompanying text discussing the Connecticut and Watson
cases, infra.
28 See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 3, at 630.
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tive proposals addressing climate change,29 only voluntary climate
change programs have been enacted at the federal level as of this writing.
The federal Clean Air Act 30 lacks a mechanism by which to regulate
GHG emissions. The principal vehicle for a possible federal GHG emis-
sion reduction program is the Clear Skies Act. 31 The Clear Skies legisla-
tion was introduced in both Houses of Congress in July 2002, and
reintroduced in February 2003 as a proposed amendment to the Clean
Air Act.32 On January 24, 2005, Senators Inhofe (R-Okla.) and Voi-
novich (R-Ohio) introduced their version of the Clear Skies Act.33
The Clear Skies legislation proposed a cap-and-trade regulatory pro-
gram, 34 which sets new targets for GHG emission reductions. 35 The pol-
lutants it targeted included sulfur dioxide, mercury, and nitrogen
oxides. 36 It did not include, however, a single measure to reduce, or
even limit carbon dioxide emissions-the chief contributor to global
warming. 37 In addition, the legislation would phase out, over the next
29 See, e.g., Climate Stewardship Act, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http:I/
thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (April 9, 2006) and Clean Power Act, S. 150, 109th Cong.
(2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (April 9, 2006).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
31 Clear Skies Act, S. 131, 109th Cong. (2005); see U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clear




34 EPA describes the mechanics of a cap-and-trade program as follows:
Cap and trade is a policy approach to controlling large amounts of emissions from a
group of sources at costs that are lower than if sources were regulated individually.
The approach first sets an overall cap, or maximum amount of emissions per compli-
ance period, that will achieve the desired environmental effects. Authorizations to
emit in the form of emissions allowances are then allocated to affected sources, and
the total number of allowances cannot exceeed the cap.
Individual control requirements are not specified for sources. The only require-
ments are that sources completely and accurately measure and report all emissions





37 See NATURAL RES. DEF. CoUNcr, DmRT SKIES: THE BUSH ADMIN.'S Am POLLUTION
PLAN, http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/qbushplan.asp (last visited April 9, 2006) (criticizing
the Clear Skies Initiative) [hereinafter NATURAL RES. DEF. CouNcIL]; see also SIERRA CLUB,
FACTS ABoUr THE BUSH ADMIN'S PLAN TO WEAKEN TE CLEAN Am ACT, http://www.sierra
club.org/cleanair/clear-skies.asp (last visited April 9, 2006) (criticizing the Bush administra-
tion's plan for failing to set a limit on carbon dioxide emissions).
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decade, the New Source Review 38 permit and enforcement program for
power plants.39
On March 9, 2005, the Environment and Public Works Committee
deadlocked, 9-9, on whether to put the Clear Skies Act to the entire Sen-
ate.40 Chairman of the Committee, James Inhofe (R-Okla.), reported that
approximately seven issues divided the Committee, including whether
there should be carbon dioxide emission limitations.41 As of this writing,
the Clear Skies initiative remains tied up in Committee.
42
In January 2003, Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) and John
McCain (R-Ariz.) introduced the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003. The
Act would cap GHG emissions at their 2000 levels after 2010.43 The bill
would also establish a market-based emissions credit-trading system to
reduce GHG emissions from power plants, refineries, and other commer-
cial entities. an In October 2003, after modifications, the measure was
defeated in the Senate by a 55-43 vote. 45
On June 22, 2005, the Senate, by a 60-38 vote, defeated a proposed
amendment to the Climate Stewardship Act that represented a weaker
version of the Kyoto Protocol mandates. 46 Citing costs, the Bush admin-
istration had urged the Senate against placing restrictions on emissions. 47
Instead, the Senate, by a 66-29 vote, approved an amendment that merely
38 The New Source Review program under the Clean Air Act is the basis by which the
regulation of air emissions from existing facilities can be made. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7515.
Under the Clean Air Act, it is rare to impose new emissions requirements on existing sources;
however, New Source Review requires that if an older regulated source undergoes changes
that increase its emissions, it must upgrade its air pollution controls to comply with current
regulatory requirements. Without New Source Review, power plants, which contribute signifi-
cantly to GHG emissions in the United States, would be excluded from stricter air pollution
controls. See generally NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 37.
39 See Climate Debate Threatens a Republican Clean-Air Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2005, at A21.
40 See Mary Curtis & Tom Hamburger, Bush's Clear Skies Act Stalls in the Senate; A 9-9
deadlock makes it likely the market-based plan indefinitely stays in committee, L.A. TIMEs,
Mar. 10, 2005, at A12.
41 Id.
42 Miguel Bustillo, Court Upholds EPA Change of Air Pollution Policy: An Appeals
Panel Oks a Dush Rule Letting Power Plants avoid Installing New Pollution Controls, L.A.
TIMEs, June 25, 2005, at A 24.
43 Climate Stewardship Act, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/search.html (last viewed April 9, 2006).
44 Id.
45 Senate Defeats Climate Bill but Proponents See Silver Lining, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31,
2003, at A14. On February 10, 2005, Senators Lieberman and McCain reintroduced this legis-
lation. Climate Stewardship Act, S. 342, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/search.html (last visited April 9, 2006).
46 Brian DuBose & Bill Sammon, Global-Warming Limits Rejected, WASH. TIMEs, June
23, 2005, at Al.
47 James Kuhnhenn, Senate Bill to Curb Global Warming Stalls as White House Cites
Costs, PHULA. INQUIRER, June 22, 2005, at A7.
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created tax incentives and loan guarantees to encourage polluters to re-
duce emissions.48
In 2005, three additional measures addressing climate change were
introduced in the Senate. The first was a bill introduced by Senators
James Jeffords (D-Vt.), Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.), and Susan Collins
(R-Maine) to retain New Source Review and to mandate tougher emis-
sion reduction standards. 49 This bipartisan legislation would also estab-
lish a federal cap on carbon dioxide emissions. 50 If implemented, this
legislation would be a good step toward an appropriate mandatory fed-
eral climate change program.
The second was a bipartisan resolution, introduced by Senator Di-
anne Feinstein (D-Calif.), calling on the United States to participate in
international negotiations pertaining to GHG emission reductions. 51 Fi-
nally, in February 2005, Senators Susan Collins (R-Maine) and Maria
Cantwell (D-Wash.) introduced legislation to increase federal funding for
abrupt climate change research, authorizing $10 million per year for the
next six years.52
While the federal government continues to debate whether and to
what extent a mandatory federal climate change program is necessary,
these federal legislative initiatives are only a small step in the right direc-
tion. Several States, regions, and cities have already implemented ag-
gressive and comprehensive climate change regulation programs.
Moreover, the private sector has adopted voluntary programs. Parts II
and III of this Article evaluate these programs.
II. STATE, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL INITIATIVES TO
COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE
A. STATE INITIATIVES
The programs reviewed below are some of the leading examples of
a broad range of regulatory strategies that States have implemented to
curb GHG emissions, 53 including establishing GHG emissions invento-
48 Id.
49 Clean Power Act, S. 150, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/search.html (last visited April 9, 2006).
50 Id.
51 United States Should Act to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, S.J. Res. 5, 109th
Cong. (2005).
52 The Abrupt Climate Change Research Act, S. 245, 109th Cong. (2005) available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.htmi (last visited April 9, 2006).
53 See generally Laura H. Kosloff, Mark C. Trexler, & Hal Nelson, Outcome-Oriented
Leadership: How State and Local Climate Change Strategies Can Most Effectively Contribute
to Global Warming Mitigation, 14 WIDENER L.J. 173 (2004) (providing an overview of the
climate change policy options and strategies available to sub-national governmental entities.);
see also Thomas D. Peterson, The Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in the United
States: Lessons Learned and New Directions, 14 WIDENER L.J. 81, 101 (2004) ("Comprehen-
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ries and reporting schemes;54 implementing carbon sequestration mea-
sures;55 and creating renewable energy incentives. 56 State regulations
have targeted the transportation, agricultural, industrial, and business
sectors.57  The most aggressive State initiatives are those enacting
mandatory controls to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.5 8
The lack of a federal response to climate change is not the only
reason for State action. State legislatures have cited a number of other
reasons for taking action, including promoting economic development,
reducing vulnerability to fluctuating energy prices, and preventing dam-
age to the States' valuable resources.59
1. Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut: Legislation
In May 2003, Maine became the first state to enact climate change
legislation.60 The law sets specific targets and timetables for carbon di-
oxide emission reductions. 61 The law codified the Comprehensive Re-
gional Climate Change Action Plan agreed to by New England
governors and Eastern Canadian premieres, 62 which includes both short-
and long-term carbon dioxide emissions reduction goals. In the short
sive state climate plans include the development of: 1) Emissions inventories and baseline
forecasts; 2) Mitigation actions and implementation mechanisms; 3) Goals and/or targets; 4)
Monitoring and reporting systems for all sectors, gases, and time periods.").
54 Laura H. Kosloff & Mark C. Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: Think Lo-
cally, Act Globally, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 46, 47 (2004) (noting that 39 States have
implemented GHG inventories and some States, including California and New Jersey, have
established GHG registries.).
55 See DOE Announces New Carbon Sequestration Partnerships, 28 PLAITrs COAL OUT-
LOOK 15, June 21, 2004, at 15. (announcing that several States and 13 organizations have
joined the Department of Energy's Carbon Sequestration Regional Partnership Program).
56 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, LEARNING FROM STATE AcrION ON CLI-
MATE CHANGE, IN BRIEF, Number 8 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what
_s_beingdone/in the states/ (noting that many states have already emphasized commitments
to promoting clean power, including the use of "green pricing.").
57 See infra notes 60 - 106 and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West Supp. 2002) (imposing
limits on GHG emissions in car exhaust).
59 Id.; see also BARRY G. RABE, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Greenhouse And
Statehouse: The Evolving State Government Role in Climate Change (Nov. 2002) (comparing
nine states' responses to climate change). Whereas New Jersey views climate change compre-
hensively and seeks to integrate all sectors of the economy into programs to reduce GHG
emissions, Texas has adopted an ambitious renewable portfolio stemming from its desire to
ensure long-term energy security for its residents and secure its position as an energy state. Id.
60 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 574-789 (West 2005).
61 Id. Officials in Maine worry that failure to regulate the sources of climate change in
the United States could raise sea levels in Maine by 16 inches by 2100. Brad Knickerbocker,
States Take Clean-Air Measures Into Their Own Hands, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Apr. 13,
2005, at 3.
62 NEW ENGLAND GOVERNORS/EASTERN CANADIAN PREMIERS, CLIMATE CHANGE Ac-
TION PLAN OF 2001 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.negc.org/documents/NEG-ECP%20
CCAP.PDF. For a discussion of other regional initiatives, see infra Part II. B.
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term, Maine seeks to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by January 1,
2010,63 whereas its long-term goal is to reduce GHG emissions as to
eliminate any dangerous threat to the climate.64 To accomplish this long-
term goal, reduction in GHG emissions to 75% to 80% below 2003
levels may be required. 65
The Maine climate change action plan also requires GHG emissions
reductions in each sector66 in cost-effective ways, and allows for the se-
questration of GHG emissions by sustainably managed forestry, agricul-
tural, and other natural resource activities.67 As part of its "lead-by-
example" initiative, Maine's plan also calls for 1) GHG emissions inven-
tories for state-owned facilities and state-funded programs, 68 2) carbon
emission reduction agreements with at least 50 businesses and nonprofit
organizations by January 1, 2006,69 3) participation in an effort to adopt
a New England greenhouse gas registry,70 and 4) creation of an annual
statewide greenhouse gas emissions inventory. 7 1
In April 2001, Massachusetts became the first State to require
power plants to reduce emissions of: 1) soot-forming sulfur dioxide, 2)
smog-forming nitrogen oxides, 3) mercury, and 4) carbon dioxide.72
Massachusetts has also committed to a variety of other initiatives includ-
ing: 1) the purchase of 15% of its energy from renewable sources by
2020; 2) creation of a Renewable Energy Trust Fund to encourage en-
ergy efficiency and renewable-energy product development; and 3) a car-
bon dioxide offset program for new utilities. 73
On May 6, 2004, Governor Mitt Romney released the long-awaited
Massachusetts Climate Protection Plan.74 The plan outlines a compre-
hensive strategy to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2010.75 The
strategy involves working with four state agencies - energy, environ-
63 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 576(1).
64 Id. § 576(3).
65 Id.
66 "Sector" refers to one of the following: transportation, industrial, commercial, institu-
tional, or residential sectors. Id. § 574(1).
67 Id. § 577.
68 Id. § 574(1).
69 Id. § 574(2).
70 Id. § 574(3).
71 Id. § 574(4).
72 MASS REos. CODE tit. 310, § 7.29 (2001).
73 Michael Northrop, Leading by Example: Profitable Corporate Strategies and Success-
ful Public Policies for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 14 WIDENER L.J. 21, 45-46
(2004).
74 THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., MASS. CLIMATE PROTECTION PLAN (Spring 2004),
available at http://www.mass.gov/Eocd/docs/pdfs/maclimateprotectionplan.pdf.
75 Id.
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ment, housing, and transportation - and calls for a variety of actions to
present a comprehensive GHG emissions reduction effort.76
The Massachusetts plan "combines requirements with incentives,
existing programs with new initiatives, regulatory streamlining with
tougher performance standards, [and] market tools with demonstration
projects. ' ' 77 Pursuant to the plan, Massachusetts has pledged to "lead by
example" in the vehicles it uses, the buildings it constructs, and the
growth it pursues. 78 The plan is divided into ten focus areas, each of
which contains "action steps" to implement its objectives. 79 These ten
focus areas are: 1) tough but realistic targets (for GHG emissions reduc-
tions); 2) assessing and communicating emissions trends; 3) state sus-
tainability - leadership by example; 4) cities and towns as climate
protection partners; 5) business, industry, and institutions as climate pro-
tection partners; 6) clean and reliable energy; 7) more efficient buildings:
reducing pollution through sustainable design and construction; 8) trans-
portation and sustainable development: increasing choices, reducing
emissions; 9) vehicles: supporting clean, efficient new technologies, and
10) natural resource protection as climate strategy.80
On June 14, 2004, the Connecticut legislature enacted legislation
mandating what had been a voluntary timeline for GHG emissions reduc-
tions, and required that the plans to meet short- and medium-term goals
be completed by 2005.81 Complying with this timeline, the Governor's
Steering Committee on Climate Change developed the Connecticut Cli-
mate Change Action Plan of 2005.82 Like Maine's climate change plan,
Connecticut's plan is geared toward achieving the regional goals of the
Comprehensive Regional Climate Change Action Plan.83
The plan contains 55 recommended actions that focus on five major
areas: 1) transportation and land use; 2) residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial energy use; 3) agriculture, forestry and waste emissions; 4) elec-
tricity generation; and 5) education and outreach. 84 In the plan, the
Governor's Steering Committee on Climate Change issued 38 recom-
76 Id. at 4.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 8.
80 Id. at 8-11.
81 An Act Concerning Climate Change, 2004 Conn. Pub. Acts 04-252, available at http:/
/www.env-ne.org/Publications/PA%2004-252%20AN%20ACT%20CONCERNING%20CLI-
MATE%20CHANGE.pdf. Specifically, the legislation calls for a reduction in GHG emissions
to 1990 levels by 2010, 10% below 1990 levels by the year 2020, and, ultimately, to stabilize
the climate by reducing emissions by 75-85%. Id.
82 See THE GovENOR'S STEERING COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONN. CLIMATE
CHANGE ACTION PLAN (2005) (submitted to Connecticut General Assembly on Feb. 15, 2005),
at www.ctclimatechange.com/StateActionPlan.html.
83 Id. at 2. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
84 Id.
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mendations for immediate implementation. 85 Examples of these recom-
mendations include raising emission standards for new cars, using energy
efficient materials and design concepts in the construction of new build-
ings, increasing the amount of renewable energy supplied to the electric-
ity grid, and promoting awareness of climate change issues through
education and outreach programs.86 According to Connecticut's Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, "[i]mplementation of the recommen-
dations will put Connecticut on target to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 and to 10% below 1990 levels by
2020."87
2. California: Aggressive Regulation
Consistent with its long history of environmental activism, Califor-
nia has adopted an aggressive climate change program. Three key areas
of California's climate change portfolio are: 1) its GHG registry, 88 which
is recognized as a model for other state registries and for an improved
federal program; 2) its coordination with Oregon and Washington to re-
duce GHG emissions; 89 and 3) its law requiring GHG emissions controls
on automobiles. 90
California's program imposing restrictions on GHG emissions from
automobile exhaust is an example of aggressive state climate change reg-
ulation. On September 24, 2004, the California Air Resources Board
implemented the nation's first limits on GHG emissions in car exhaust. 91
The regulations apply to new passenger cars, sports utility vehicles, and
pickup trucks sold in the 2009 model year.92
Opponents of California's motor vehicle GHG emissions regulation
argue that the "creation of ... state laws regulating fundamental vehicle
85 Id. at 4.
86 Id.
87 CON. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., Connecticut Climate Change Action Plan Finalized
(Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.dep.state.ct.us. Connecticut also participates in sev-
eral collaborative efforts with other states. For example, it adopted California's low emission
vehicle standards, and is a member of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Id. Progress on
the implementation of Connecticut's climate change initiatives can be tracked at www.ctcli-
matechange.com.
88 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42800-42870 (West Supp. 2002).
89 Press Release, California Governor's Office, Governors Davis, Locke and Kulongoski
Announce Tri-State Strategy to Reduce Global Warming (Sep. 22, 2003), available at http://
www.governor.ca.gov, cited in Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Local Solutions for Global
Problems: The Debate Over the Causes and Effects of Climate Change and Emerging Mitiga-
tion Strategies for States, Localities, and Private Parties, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 11-
12 (2004).
90 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West Supp. 2002).
91 Kosloff, Trexler & Nelson, supra note 53; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 43018.5(a) (West Supp. 2002).
92 CAL. HEALTH & SAFTEY CODE § 43018.5(b)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
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design elements would be harmful to the industry and costly to consum-
ers."'93 In addition, automobile manufacturers asserted that the regula-
tions will likely increase the cost of vehicles by $3000 while having little
impact on climate change. 94 The automobile manufacturers further as-
serted that the new regulation is in effect a fuel economy standard, and
that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is the only
agency authorized to regulate fuel economy.95
3. New Jersey: A Comprehensive Approach
Since 1998, New Jersey has supported the Kyoto Protocol's emis-
sion reduction targets and timetables. 96 In addition to its early commit-
ment to reduce emission levels to 3.5% below 1990 levels by 2005, the
state also has adopted a multi-faceted regulatory approach-calling for
interagency coordination, establishment of an emissions banking system
in coordination with international efforts, development of clean fuel
fleets, energy conservation efforts, and a GHG emissions inventory and
reporting requirements. 97  These requirements allow New Jersey to
pinpoint readily available cost-effective strategies to mitigate emis-
sions. 98 New Jersey also requires sources that report other air emissions
to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to report car-
bon dioxide emissions.99
93 International Automakers Seek to Block California Action to Regulate Greenhouse
Gases, PR NEWSWIRE (U.S.), Feb. 3, 2005, available at http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/
stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/02-03-2005/0002947601&EDATE=.
94 See California Adopts Regulations Controlling Carbon Dioxide, Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, NACS Online, Sept. 28, 2004, available at www.nacsonline.com/nacs/news/daily-
news-archives/September2004/nd0928044.htm.
95 Id.
96 NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SUSTAINABILITY GREEN-
HOUSE ACTION PLAN (December 1999) at Appendix 8-10 (Administrative Order 1998-09 (Mar.
17, 1998)), available at http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dsr/gcc/GHGO2revisions.pdf.
97 Id.
98 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AcTIvrrEs IN THE
U.S. 2004 UPDATE 9 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what-s_being-
done/usactivities_2004.cfm (last visited April 9, 2006) (explaining that New Jersey's compre-
hensive approach to achieving its GHG reduction target includes mandatory GHG reporting)
[hereinafter PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE]. New Jersey's GHG emissions
registry originally was integrated into its Open Market Emissions Trading regulations, which
allowed for the generation and banking of GHG credits along with additional opportunities for
trading. Robert B. McKinstry, Laboratories for Local Solutions to Global Problems: State,
Local, and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of
Climate Change, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 15, 41 (2004). On February 25, 2004, New
Jersey repealed the Open Market Emissions Trading Program. See www.nj.gov/dep/aqm/
whatsnew.htm. See generally Devin P. DeMarco, The Origin and Demise of New Jersey's
Open Market Emissions Trading Program, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10032 (2005).
99 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, WHAT'S BEING DONE IN THE STATES, avail-
able at http://www.pewclimate.org/what-sbeingdone/in-the-states/reporting-map.cfm (last
visited April 9, 2006).
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On October 18, 2005, New Jersey took an important step forward
and adopted regulations classifying carbon dioxide as an air contami-
nant. 100 The rule excludes carbon dioxide from "the list of chemical spe-
cies defined as distillates of air" and classifies carbon dioxide as an air
contaminant.' 10  With the new rule, the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJDEP) confirms that "regulating C02 is in the
best interest of human health, welfare, and the environment."' 10 2 NJDEP
based its determination on "compelling scientific evidence of existing
and projected adverse impacts due to climate change on the environment,
ecosystems, wildlife, human health, and enjoyment of life or property in
the state."' 0 3 This measure could help lay the foundation for a similar
classification by the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide at the federal
level. ' 0 4
While the focus of New Jersey's climate change initiatives is on
power plants, its initiatives also reach other industries. For example,
New Jersey's largest water utility is installing the state's largest ground-
mounted solar electric project.10 5 This pilot program, if successful, may
lead other treatment plants in New Jersey to use solar energy.' 0 6
B. REGIONAL INITIATIVES
Nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states are currently working to
establish a cap-and-trade system for power plant carbon dioxide emis-
sions, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). 0 7 The
RGGI is an incremental approach to climate change since it only targets
GHG emissions from the power plant industry, as opposed to regulating
all industrial sources of GHGs. 10 8 Under RGGI, power plants will be
allocated emission allowances, measured in units of one ton of carbon
100 Press Release, New Jersey Officer of the Govenor, Codey Takes Crucial Step to Com-
bat Global Warming, available at http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/govemor/njnewsline/view-
article.pl?id=2779. This action enabled New Jersey to participate in the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative, which regulates carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. Id. For a discus-
sion of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, see infra Part II. B.




104 See infra notes 190 - 201 and accompanying text discussing the Massachusetts v. EPA
case.
105 Waste Generator Briefs, WASTE NEWS, March 14, 2005, at 5.
106 Id. This solar project will save the company in energy costs, and provide 15% of the
peak usage power needed to run the plant. id.
107 See REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, AN INITIATIVE OF THE NORTHEASTERN AND
MID-ATLANTIC STATES OF THE U.S., at http://www.rggi.org [hereinafter REG'L GREENHOUSE
GAS INrTATIVE]; see also Douglas W. Smith & Kyle W. Danish, Climate Change: The Heat
Is On, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 2004, at 55.
108 See generally PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INNOVATIVE POL'Y SOLU-
TIONS TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: LEARNING FROM STATE ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 8
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dioxide produced. 0 9 Power plants can either reduce their emissions or
purchase allocations on a market from others.' i0 To facilitate RGGI, the
Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management currently is de-
veloping a Regional Greenhouse Gas Registry (RGGR).I 1I
Unlike RGGI's regulatory approach, the focus of regional initiatives
among western states is to promote renewable energy generation. The
Western Governors' Association, which is comprised of 18 western
states and three U.S.-flag Pacific islands, is investigating strategies to
increase efficiency and to increase renewable energy source use in the
region's electricity systems." 2 The Western Governors' Association has
also developing the Western Renewable Energy Generation Information
System (WREGIS). 13 WREGIS is a voluntary system that tracks all
renewable energy generation in the geographic region governed by the
Western Electricity Coordinating Council, which covers approximately
340 stakeholders from 11 western states and 2 Canadian provinces. 4
WREGIS creates renewable energy certificates (RECs); 115 tracks whole-
sale renewable energy transactions involving RECs; verifies ownership,
trading, and retirement of RECs; and creates independent reports on REC
transactions for market participants and state and provincial
regulators. 116
Over the past decade, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) Energy Star program has helped regional utilities im-
plement low-cost energy efficiency programs.' 17 The Program, in addi-
tion to reducing consumer energy costs, has also contributed to a
reduction in national electricity demand by almost four percent, annually
saving consumers ten billion dollars." 8 Moreover, it has prevented the
release of the equivalent of the GHG emissions of twenty million vehi-
IN BRIEF, (Dec. 2004), available at http://pewclimate.org/docUploads/States%5FInBrief%2
Epdf.
109 See Reg'l Greenhouse Gas linitiative, supra note 107.
11o Id.
S11 Smith & Danish, supra note 107. Mechanisms such as RGGR that require reporting
of GHGs allow states and regions to create reliable inventories of emission sources. Emissions
inventories 1) provide information for future policies; 2) lead to the discovery of cost-effective
and cost-saving reduction opportunities; and 3) establish baseline emissions. Id.
112 See Western Governors' Association, http://www.westgov.org/; see also PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 98 (discussing the Western Governors' Association).
113 See http://www.westgov.org/wga-wregis.htm.
114 See www.westgov.org/wieb/wregisfWREGIS-FAQ.pdf.
115 RECs represent a contractual right to the "non-energy" attributes associated with a
specific amount of electricity generation. Id.
116 Id.
117 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, News Brief. EPA and NARUC Announce Energy Effi-
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cles into the environment. 119 Building on this foundation, the EPA and
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)
have formed the EPA-State Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
(EERE) Project.' 20
Like the Energy Star program, the EERE projects will benefit con-
sumers by reducing the cost of electric and gas bills, while simultane-
ously reducing GHG emissions through the creation of lower cost,
cleaner power systems.12' The EERE projects will explore policies and
programs that will provide consumers with more energy efficient op-
tions. l22 Specifically, they will explore combined heat and power sys-
tems and renewable energy alternatives. 12 3 The potential of this
initiative should not be underestimated. The EPA estimates that "if all
states were to implement cost-effective energy efficiency and clean en-
ergy policies, the expected growth in demand for electricity could be cut
in half by 2025, providing billions of dollars in customer savings, con-
tributing to lower prices for natural gas and substantially reducing green-
house gas emissions."' 124
C. LOCAL INITIATIVES
State climate change initiatives have encouraged increased local ac-
tion. Some of the large cities that have programs to reduce GHG emis-
sions are Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; San Diego, California;
Salt Lake City, Utah; Austin, Texas; and Minneapolis, Minnesota. 125
Smaller cities adopting climate protection programs include Boulder and
Fort Collins, Colorado; Burlington, Vermont; Cambridge, Massachu-
setts; and New Haven, Connecticut. 126
Like regional initiatives amongst states, local communities have
formed a collaborative regulatory initiative to combat climate change. 127
In 2003, 155 mayors signed the Mayor's Statement on Global Warming,
which calls on the federal government to recognize the urgency of cli-
mate change and to find a solution to the problem.' 28 The signatories







125 Margaret Kriz, Many States United in Fighting Warming, ENVTL. F., March./April
2005, at 6.
126 See Brad Knickerbocker, States Take Clean-Air Measures Into Their Own Hands,
CHRIMAN SCL MONITOR, Apr. 13, 2005, at 3.
127 U.S. Mayor's Statement on Global Warming, www.climatenetwork.org/uscanweb/csa
docs/mayorspr.pdf.
128 See generally id.
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GHG emissions by identifying the sources of emissions, and determining
how best to reduce emissions. 129 In addition, more than 140 cities and
counties participate in Cities for Climate Protection, a global campaign
organized by the International Council for Local Environment
Initiatives. 130
Taking local initiative one step further, 132 mayors have embraced
Kyoto Protocol mandates for their cities.' 3 ' Representing almost 29 mil-
lion citizens in 35 states, these mayors have pledged to have their cities
comply with what would have been required under the Kyoto Protocol if
the U.S. were a party to the agreement: a reduction in GHG emissions to
levels 7 % below 1990 levels by 2012.132
Of the many cities taking action, California's cities have emerged as
leaders. By 2010, both San Francisco and San Jose intend to reduce
emission levels by 20%. 133 To meet this target, San Francisco has imple-
mented a wide array of initiatives, including: 1) fuel-cell powered vehi-
cles; 2) new traffic lights that are up to 80% more efficient; 3) green
building ordinances; 4) energy-efficient designs; and 5) closing some of
the city's polluting power plants. 134
D. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF STATE, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL
INITIATIVES
State, regional, and local initiatives are significant steps toward reg-
ulating climate change in the United States. Nevertheless, these pro-
grams do not affect the regulated community as extensively as a federal
mandatory command-and-control regime would because of the "patch-
work" effect created by some areas of the country imposing strict regula-
tory requirements while neighboring areas have no requirements at all.
The Pew Center on Global Climate Change cites three factors that
limit the effectiveness of state regulation: 1) states have limited re-
sources, potentially jeopardizing long-term climate change policies; 2)
129 See generally Gregory Dicum, Kyoto By The Bay: Local Cities Defy Federal Govern-
ment, Make Own Climate Policies, SAN FRANCISCO GATE, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2005/02/1 6/gree.DTL&hw=Bay+Area+Cities+
Make+Own+Climate+Policies&sn=016&sc=264.
130 See Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 54, at 47.
131 Eli Sanders, Rebuffing Bush, 132 Mayors Embrace Kyoto Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2005, at A9.
132 Id.
133 Dicum, supra note 129.
134 See, e.g., Dana Abbott, San Francisco Builds Green, E MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 2005, at
10, 11; Mayor Newsom, SFPUC Announce Historic "Action Plan" to Close F.F. Polluting
Power Plants, SAN FRANcisco Pun. UTr. COMM'N., http://sfwater.org/printContent.cfm/C-
ID/224 1; Gloria Chan, San Francisco Adopts High Efficiency Standards for Municipal Build-
ings, SF ENV'T, Jun. 30, 2004, http://www.sfenvionment.cocm/articles-pr/2004/pr/063004.
htm.
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states lack the authority to implement a comprehensive climate change
policy-for example, the authority to enter into international agreements;
and 3) the hodgepodge of different policies may create an inefficient and
unpredictable environment for industry and business. 135
Critics of State regulation cite GHG "leakage," which is where
GHG-intensive industries shift operations to areas where regulations are
less strict. 136 For example, Senator James Inhofe (R-Okla.) has argued
that states with aggressive climate change initiatives will bear the cost of
these initiatives in the form of lost jobs, closed manufacturing plants, and
higher prices. 137
Regional programs are perhaps the best "laboratories" and potential
precursors to a mandatory federal climate change program. If the RGGI
cap-and-trade system proves successful in reducing GHG emissions, it
will likely serve as the foundation for a future mandatory federal pro-
gram. 138 Moreover, the RGGI scheme may link with the European
Union's emissions control and trading system, thereby allowing trans-
Atlantic emission allowance trading.139 To the extent that regional pro-
grams like RGGI and WREGIS, which cover a significant percentage of
the geographic area of the continental United States, are successful, a
mandatory federal program should not be far behind, at least in principle.
III. VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE MEASURES
Voluntary compliance measures are likely to reduce industry's cost
of complying with possible future mandatory controls, and they are a
step in the right direction until a mandatory federal program is in place.
Moreover, like state, local, and regional initiatives, voluntary compliance
measures will help policymakers shape the content and scope of a future
federal mandatory regulatory regime. However, the regulated commu-
nity wants a level playing field before it will make significant reductions
that may involve economic sacrifices. Therefore, it is only when a
mandatory federal program is in place that the regulated community will
make significant progress in GHG emissions reductions.
135 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 98.
136 See Brian Stempeck, Climate Change: All Signs Point to Continued Greenhouse Gas
Efforts by States, GREENWIRE, Nov. 12, 2004 (noting that competition in retail electricity gen-
eration markets may encourage businesses to use cheaper unregulated electricity generated in a
state without greenhouse gas controls).
137 Stempeck, supra note 136; see Brian Stempeck, Climate Change: State Action Heats
Up as N.J. Labels C02 a Pollutant, GREENwIRE, Sept. 17, 2004, http://global.factiva.comez-
proxy.library.comell.edu:2048/en/arch/print-result.asp.
138 See generally Joseph Kruger & William A. Pizer, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initita-
tive: Prelude to a National Program?, RESOURCES, 4-6 (Winter 2005).
139 See Saeed Shah, U.S. States Defy Bush Over Greenhouse Gases, THE INDEPENDENT
(U.K.), Nov. 12, 2004, at 30 (stating that "informal talks have already taken place between
environmental officials of the U.S. states and their European Commission counterparts.").
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Corporations understand that promoting environmental health has a
very real effect on the viability of their business. First, corporations that
adopt climate change action plans derive a competitive advantage by
achieving long-term emission cuts, and by identifying low-cost opportu-
nities to reduce current emissions. 140 Second, corporations must also re-
spond to external factors, including shareholder resolutions and suits, 14 1
increased scrutiny from the insurance industry, 142 and climate change lit-
igation. 143 Although these external pressures encourage the regulated
community to be proactive in monitoring emissions, the emissions reduc-
tions realized in response to such pressures still fall short of the reduc-
tions that would be required in a mandatory federal program.
A. EMISSIONS INVENTORIES
The first stage of a GHG emission reduction plan is the preparation
of an inventory of past and present carbon dioxide emissions. 144 An in-
ventory is a formal system for measuring, aggregating, and reporting
140 See Michael Northrop, Early Reducers, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 16-29 (provid-
ing examples of several leading companies that have voluntarily reduced greenhouse gas
emissions).
141 See Elizabeth E. Hancock, Note, Red Dawn, Blue Thunder, Purple Rain: Corporate
Risk of Liability for Global Climate Change and the SEC Disclosure Dilemma, 17 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 233 (2005); Greening Petroleum: U.S. Oil and Gas Companies Bow to Share-
holders on Climate, ENERGY, Mar. 22, 2005, at 243.
142 An unprecedented number of weather-related disaster insurance claims were filed in
2004, making it the most expensive year in history for the insurance industry in terms of
payouts for damage from natural disasters. Tim Hirsch, Climate Change Hits Bottom Line,
BBc NEWS (Dec. 15, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4100049.stm. The re-
insurance sector is aware of and is taking steps to assess the potential impact of climate change
on its own business. See Thomas Atkins, Insurer Warns of Global Warming Catastrophe,
REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0303-07.
htm. Swiss Re, a leading provider of directors- and officers-liability insurance, has a Green-
house Gas Risk Solutions Unit and Directors and Officers Underwriting Group that has identi-
fied the new kind of risk posed by climate change, and has jointly developed a questionnaire to
evaluate companies' policies on climate change. Reinsurance, (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
http://www.swissre.comINTERNET/pwswpspr.nsf/fmBookMarkFrameSet?ReadForm&BM=
• ./vwAllbylDKeyLu/ULUR-5K6HPW?OpenDocument. The feedback helps underwriters as-
sess the quality of a risk. Id. A U.S.-based managing director for Swiss Re explained that the
company is considering withdrawing its policies for companies that it deems inadequately
prepared for future climate change regulation. Smith & Danish, supra note 107, at 56.
143 For a discussion of climate change litigation, see infra Part IV.
144 See THE Bus. ROUNDTABLE, EVERY SECTOR, ONE RESOLVE: A PROGRESS REPORT ON
Bus. ROUNTABLE'S CLIMATE RESOLVE PROGRAM (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.
businessroundtable.org/pdf/climateRESOLVE/2004CRAnnualReport.pdf. According to a pro-
gress report highlighting the efforts of Climate RESOLVE, a voluntary program formed by the
Business Roundtable (a coalition of chief executives of leading corporations) to help reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, 107 companies are considering voluntary steps to reduce green-
house gas emissions. The group said 92% of these companies are reviewing GHG emissions
profiles, 90% are evaluating opportunities to reduce, avoid, offset, or sequester or offset emis-
sions, 76% are participating in government-sponsored programs and 72% are reporting GHG
emissions activities to the public. Id.
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emissions or energy use on a regular basis.145 At a minimum, an inven-
tory helps a company establish baseline emissions, even if it is not pre-
pared to address GHG emissions. 146 In addition, the information drawn
from it will provide a starting point for the development of a rational
strategy to address emissions in the future.147 A company will also use
the emissions inventory to set reduction targets, to develop a reduction
plan, and to track future progress. 148
Since the Kyoto Protocol sets the benchmark for GHG reductions at
1990 levels, corporations should: 1) inventory emissions that reach as
close as possible to 1990 levels; and 2) document any reductions in GHG
emissions since then. 149 The inventory must be credible, verifiable, and
quantifiable to ensure that a possible future regulatory regime can recog-
nize and credit such documentation. 150 Accordingly, an independent
technical consultant should prepare the data or, at the least, verify the
work of in-house analysts.' 51 Moreover, companies should register the
data in one of the established corporate emission inventory registries. 152
B. TARGETS AND TIMETABLES TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS
A growing number of corporations are setting GHG reduction
targets and are making progress in reducing their emissions.' 53 Compa-
nies have adopted several types of GHG emissions reduction targets.
While some focus directly on GHGs and set absolute limits, others focus
on energy use, purchases, or products.' 54 Multinational corporations are
especially likely to have targets, since they will soon face mandatory
regulatory regimes outside the United States pursuant to Kyoto Protocol
implementing legislation requirements in other countries. Other compa-
145 WORLD RES. INST., SUPPORTING GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES, available at http:/
www.thegreenpowergroup.org/WR-position-statement-emissions -inventories 02-20-03.pdf.
146 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AN OVERVIEW OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMIS-




149 J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy Issue for
Corporate Counsel - It's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 109 (2004).
150 Id.
151 See id. at 109-10.
152 Id.
153 See generally PEW CTR. ON GLOABAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CORPORATE GREENHOUSE
GAS REDUCTION TARGETS (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warm-
ing-in-depth/all-reports/corporate.greenhouse-targets/ndex.cfm.
154 Id. at iii. According to an updated report, four general considerations influence a
company's choice of target type: 1) the target's effect on emission reductions; 2) the existence
of uncontrollable factors relating to emissions or energy use; 3) the opportunity for cost-effec-
tive emissions or energy reductions; and 4) the potential impact on company growth. Id.
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nies are setting GHG reduction targets for a variety of reasons. First,
companies believe that targets will improve their bottom line and drive
innovation. 5 5 Second, they believe these investments will pay off over
the long term, because of continued global regulation. 56 Third, they be-
lieve a proactive approach will result in a policy regime in the United
States that works in concert with the diverse needs of business. 57
A company contemplating GHG emission targets can turn to the
Pew Center on Global Climate Change for guidance. For example, the
Pew Center composed an in-depth case study featuring six diverse com-
panies, entitled Corporate Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets.58 This
report reviewed the corporate target-setting process of each of the six
companies from beginning to end.' 59
C. PROMOTING CLEAN ENERGY AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Many companies are purchasing or developing renewable energy
sources that do not emit GHGs. 160 Companies that have reduced their
consumption of carbon-intense energy have realized new efficiencies and
financial returns, by reducing their production costs. 16 1 Many of the
strategies employed are quite simple,' 62 such as increased use of wind 163
and solar' 64 power. In addition, companies are reducing energy use and
GHG emissions through energy conservation and efficiency measures, 65




159 This process includes the decision to act on climate change; the factors involved in
setting a target; management and employee management; evaluating; monitoring; and per-
formance review.
160 See Northrop, supra note 140, at 17.
161 Id.
162 Id. (recognizing that most of these efforts have used little "gee-whiz" technology and
rely primarily on improvements in energy efficiency and renewable energy sources).
163 For example on June 24, 2005, an independent power producer of wind energy, Gree-
nlight Energy, announced that it received approval to develop a large wind farm near the town
of Akron in Northeastern Colorado. See Plans Underway for Colorado's Largest Wind Farm
(July 6, 2005), available at www.renewableenergyaccess.com/rea/news/story?id=34089.
164 See Kevin G. Demarrais, In New Jersey, Solar Sells, THE RECORD, June 22, 2005
(describing New Jersey's solar energy market, which is driven by incentives and rebates, as
one of the fastest-growing solar markets in the United States).
165 Voluntary business-government partnerships also have been created to minimize GHG
emissions. See Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Through Emissions Trading, 17 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 286 (2004). Fourteen companies and
environmental groups have partnered in projects resulting in a nearly two-million-ton reduc-
tion of carbon dioxide emissions. Another 1.8 million-ton-reduction is projected by 2007. See
also Business Wire, Public-Private Partnership Addresses Climate Change and Restores Crit-
ical Habitat (May 28, 2004) (discussing the joining of forces between Cinergy Corp., the
Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources, Environmental Synergy, Inc. and The
Conservation Fund to create a market-based conservation solution that will offset the environ-
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such as establishing in-house energy targets and energy reviews. 166 Fi-
nally, carbon sequestration is a cost-effective method of combating cli-
mate change.167 Carbon sequestration is the long-term storage of carbon
in forests, soils, geological formations and other carbon sinks. 168 Some
businesses are currently engaged in efforts to enhance carbon sinks. 169
In 2004, the World Resources Institute (WRI) released a report, A
Climate of Innovation: Northeast Business Action to Reduce Greenhouse
Gases, containing case studies of nine diverse Northeast-based U.S. cor-
porations' programs to reduce GHG emissions. The report cites specific
examples of how the nine companies have capitalized on efficiency in
connection with their efforts to reduce GHG emissions.1 70 These compa-
nies are, however, at the forefront; they are pioneers in what will hope-
fully become a widespread corporate movement.
For example, Citigroup upgraded its lighting, heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning systems at 270 of its retail branches. 171 Traditional
retrofitting of the system control units would have required extensive
rewiring and would have cost up to $25,000 per branch. Instead, the
energy-efficient renovation project cost just $2.5 million, and Citigroup
recouped $469,000 in energy efficiency rebates from the New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority, and an additional $38,000
from the Long Island Power Authority.
Staples and Con Edison also enjoyed significant savings in making
energy-efficient adjustment to their business practices. For example,
Staples decreased its energy use by 12.3% per square foot of floor space
since 2001, which saved $4.5 million in the first year and an additional
$2 million in the second year.172 Similarly, Con Edison reduced its
emissions of methane by more than 47,000 metric tons (equivalent to
more than 1 million tons of carbon dioxide) and avoided approximately
$5 million in avoided leakage costs. 173
mental impacts of GHGs, provide new fish and wildlife habitat, and bring recreation-driven
economic benefits to Kentucky).
166 See generally COALITION FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE ECONOMIES (CERES)
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Jun. 2003). CERES is a coalition of inves-
tors, environmental groups, and public interest groups.
167 Groups such as the Conservation Fund work with the private sector to address climate
change. The fund works with corporations on efforts directed at carbon sequestration. See
http://www.conservationfund.org/?article=2378&back=true.
168 The UNFCCC defines a "sink" as "any process, activity, or mechanism which
removes a greenhouse gas ... from the atmosphere." UNFCCC, supra note 1, at art. 1(8).
169 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 98, at 43.
170 See generally WORLD REs. INST., RESEARCH REPORT: A CLIMATE OF INNOVATION
(Oct. 27, 2004), available at http://business.wri.org/pubs-description.cfm?PublD=4031.
171 Id. at 8.
172 Id. at 23.
173 Id. at 15.
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Innovative technologies for producing and consuming energy are,
however, necessary to dramatically alter the carbon-intensive profile of
the U.S. economy.' 7 4 Major industries are interested in carbon-friendly
technologies;17 5 their interest, however, must become a multi-decade
commitment to change basic technologies used to power cars, run facto-
ries, and generate electricity. 176
D. EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS AND EARLY REDUCTION CREDITS
Emissions trading introduces scarcity by limiting overall emissions,
specifying firm-level limits, and by encouraging companies that can cost-
effectively reduce emissions below their firm limit to do so. Companies
that cannot cost-effectively comply with their firm limit can purchase
tradable emissions rights, or credits, from those companies that have re-
duced their emissions below their firm limits. Investing in projects that
sequester carbon dioxide also generates credits. 177 Since many multina-
tional corporations have reduced GHG emissions, a market in GHG re-
ductions has emerged. 178
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a pilot GHG emissions
reduction and trading exchange between American, Canadian and Mexi-
can companies. 79 Established in 2000, CCX was derived from feasibil-
ity and design research supported by grants from the Joyce Foundation, a
leading public policy philanthropy.' 80 It is the first private, voluntary
program in the United States that permits members to cap and trade their
GHG emissions. 18' CCX members have made a voluntary but legally
binding commitment to reduce their GHG emissions by four percent be-
low the average of their 1998-2001 baseline by December 2006.182
Members represent a broad sampling of the regulated community, in-
cluding railroad companies, municipalities, universities, forest product
companies, chemical companies, and electric power companies. 183 In
174 See Robert M. Sussman, Climate Change, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 19.
175 For example, the transportation sector represents approximately one third of U.S. total
GHG emissions. To reduce emissions, companies within this sector are developing cleaner,
more efficient vehicles, using clean energy vehicles in their fleets, and reducing fuel consump-
tion by moving people and goods more efficiently. See PEw CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 98, at 40 (2004).
176 See Sussman, supra note 174, at 25.
177 See Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. is Pressuring Industries to Cut Greenhouse Gases, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at Al.
178 For an outline of the progress made by several companies that employ some form of
emissions trading, see Bryner, supra note 165, at 281-284.
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CCX's first year, members' total carbon dioxide output fell by more than
eight percent. 184
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
Litigation may be the most effective means of forcing the federal
government to respond to climate change. For example, rather than face
the possibility of bad publicity and large verdicts against them, climate
change litigation may prompt the regulated community to lobby Con-
gress for mandatory federal GHG emissions reduction legislation that
would ensure more predictable parameters of responsibility and liability.
Plaintiffs have brought climate change suits under various legal the-
ories. Some have been brought under statutory theories, which compel
agencies to perform a mandatory duty. 185 Other cases have been brought
under common law theories, such as public nuisance. 186
The current wave of climate change litigation is reminiscent of the
environmental citizen suit revolution of the 1970's and 1980's. The de-
velopment of the environmental citizen suit movement and its record of
success is a helpful reference point from which to assess the potential of
current climate change litigation.
A. DIFFERENT STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE
COURTS
Three major climate change cases were on the 2005 federal
docket. 87 The plaintiffs in each case are proceeding under different le-
gal theories. 188 These cases underscore the inadequacy of the current
federal regulatory regime, emphasizing the need for a more proactive
federal approach. Litigation, however, is a two-way street. For example,
in California, the automobile industry is currently challenging regula-
tions that restrict auto emissions. 89
184 Stevenson Swanson, Experts See States as Force in Fighting Global Warming, CHI-
CAGO TRIB., Nov. 12, 2004, at 1.
185 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
186 See Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04-CV-05669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (trial pleading); see also David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea:
Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003) (addressing other
possible common-law theories for climate change litigation).
187 See Conn. v. Amer. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), Mass. v.
EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir 2005); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW,
2005 WL 2035596 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 23, 2005)
188 See Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (suit against EPA seeking to
list carbon dioxide as an air pollutant under the Clean Air Act); Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
No. 04-CV-05669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (public nuisance suit against major
power companies).
189 See infra notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
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1. Carbon Dioxide as a Pollutant under the Clean Air Act
In June 2003, the State Attorneys General of Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts, and Maine jointly brought suit against the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) in the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut,' 90 alleging that the EPA violated the Clean Air Act by
failing to list carbon dioxide as a criteria air pollutant. 191 The states ar-
gued that the EPA had a duty to list carbon dioxide, since the EPA had
already concluded that carbon dioxide is an air pollutant, which, in turn,
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 192
In August 2003, the "EPA, however, withdrew and reversed its earlier
position that carbon dioxide is an air pollutant subject to regulation under
the Clean Air Act . .193 conclud[ing] that it lacked legal authority to
regulate [GHGs].' ' 194
Twelve states, several cities, and more than a dozen environmental
groups challenged the EPA's ruling in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit. On July 15, 2005, the D.C. Circuit dismissed
the lawsuit, holding that the EPA had the authority to reject a 1999 peti-
tion requesting the federal regulation of GHG emissions from new motor
vehicles. 195 Writing for the majority, Judge Randolph concluded that the
EPA properly denied the petition, noting that "New motor vehicles are
but one of many sources of greenhouse gas emissions" and that
"[p]romulgating regulations under [the Clean Air Act] would result in an
inefficient, piecemeal approach to the climate change issue." 196
It appears that, at least for the time being, the EPA will not require
businesses to reduce GHG emissions. The D.C. Circuit's decision, how-
ever, does not limit states' authority to regulate climate change. 197 Thus,
the decision does not alter the status quo. The D.C. Circuit's decision is
the highest judgment from a U.S. court on this issue.
190 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir 2005); see Press Release, Conn. Att'y General's




193 OFFICE OF MASS. Ai-r'Y GENERAL TOM REILLY, Climate Change (Global Warming),
http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid= 1234.
194 Id. On the same day, the EPA refused to promulgate a rule addressing motor vehicle
emission of GHGs.
195 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In a 2-1 decision, the D.C.
Circuit denied the petitioners' petition for rehearing. No. 03-1361 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 2, 2005).
196 Id. at 58.
197 See Darren Samuelson, Climate Change: Split Court Upholds EPA Decision on
Greenhouse Gases, GREENWIRE, July 15, 2005, available at www.eenews.net/Greenwire/in-
clude/pint.php?single=07150501.
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On March 2, 2006, a petition for writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court was filed. 198 Counsel for petitioners argued that
the D.C. Circuit's decision departed from Supreme Court precedent
when the Court upheld the EPA's decision based on factors not men-
tioned in the relevant statutory provision. 199 In addition, counsel for pe-
titioners asserted that the EPA misinterpreted two Supreme Court
cases 2° ° in concluding that it lacked authority to regulate pollutants asso-
ciated with climate change.201
2. Power Plants and Public Nuisance Theory
In July 2004, eight States and the City of New York filed a com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against five of the country's largest power companies. 20 2 The suit
alleged that global warming constitutes a public nuisance threatening the
States with widespread harm, and that the defendants have contributed to
the nuisance as the nation's largest emitters of carbon dioxide.20 3 Ac-
cording to the complaint, U.S. electric power plants are responsible for
"ten percent of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions from human activi-
ties."'204 The complaint asserted a federal common law and state tort law
198 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3517
(U.S. Mar. 2, 2006) (No. 05-1120).
199 Id. at 13-16.
200 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
201 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 198, at 16-22. On June 27, 2006, the petition for
certiorari was granted. Fn 198 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cit. 2005), petition for cert.
granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3713 (June 27, 2006) (No. 05-1120). The Supreme Court certified two
issues for review: 1) whether the EPA Administrator may decline to issue emission standards
for motor vehicles based on policy consderations not enumberated in Section 202 (a)(1) of the
Clean Air Act; and 2) whether the EPA Adminsitrator has authority to regulate carbon dioxide
and other air pollutants associated with climate change under Section 202 (a)(1). Fn 198 Id.
202 Conn. v. American Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Press
Release, Office of the California Att'y General, Att'y General Lockyer Files Lawsuit to Re-
duce Global Warming Emissions from Five Largest Polluters (July 21, 2004), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=709. The lawsuit was filed jointly by Attorney
General Bill Lockyer of California, and Attorneys General Richard Blumenthal of Connecti-
cut, Tom Miller of Iowa, Peter Harvey of New Jersey, Elliot Spitzer of New York, Patrick
Lynch of Rhode Island, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Peg Lautenschlager of Wisconsin.
New York City also joined the action. Id.
203 Id; see Press Release, Pacifica Research Inst., California's Climate Change Litigation
Heralded at International Conference (Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://www.pacificresearch.
org/press/rel/2004/maO4-12-17.html. California took the lead in initiating the suit against
these private companies in an effort to force deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, a
representative of the California Attorney General's office spoke about how litigation can be
used to force such cuts in carbon dioxide emissions during recent international climate change
talks in Buenos Aires. Unlike the federal government, which has failed to act on the climate
change issue, the state of California is schooling other countries in the climate change mitiga-
tion strategy of litigation. Id.
204 Complaint at T 100, Amer. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
KYOTO OR NOT, HERE WE COME
claim, and sought a permanent injunction requiring defendants to cap and
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by a specified percentage. 20 5
The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.20 6 The court concluded that the case
presented a non-justiciable political question.207 The court reasoned that
"[b]ecause resolution of the issues presented here requires identification
and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national
security interests, 'an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion' is required. ' 20 8 The court distinguished the
plaintiffs' reliance on the pollution-as-public-nuisance cases because
those cases did not touch on "so many areas of national and international
policy" as at issue in the scope and magnitude of the relief the plaintiffs
sought in this case. 20 9
The court further noted that to resolve typical air pollution cases,
"courts must strike a balance 'between interests seeking strict schemes to
reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests advanc-
ing the economic concern that strict schemes [will] retard industrial de-
velopment with attendant social costs.' "210 The court concluded that
balancing those interests, together with the other interests involved in the
case at hand, is impossible without an "initial policy determination" from
Congress or the Executive. 211
3. NEPA and Federal Agency Funding of Projects Overseas
The city of Oakland, California, the city of Boulder, Colorado, and
environmental groups Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace brought suit
against the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Ex-
port-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), alleging that they
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), by providing
over 32 billion dollars in financing and insurance for projects over the
last ten years without assessing the projects impact on climate change, or
their impact on the U.S. environment, as required by NEPA.212 In No-
vember 2004, the Government filed a motion for summary judgment
205 See id. at 1. Two regional conservation groups filed a parallel suit.
206 Amer. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d at 274.
207 Id.
208 Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
209 Id. at 272
210 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
211 Id.
212 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596
(N.D.Cal. Aug. 23, 2005). Friends of the Earth President, Brent Blackwelder, commented on
the participation of the cities of Oakland and Boulder in the matter: "The Bush administra-
tion's stance on climate change fails America's cities. Oakland and Boulder are taking a bold
stand to defend themselves and hold our government accountable;" see Media Kit, U.S. Gov-
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contending that: 1) the plaintiffs lack standing; 2) OPIC and Ex-Im Bank
have not taken any action subjecting them to judicial review; and 3)
OPIC is exempt from NEPA.213
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, Judge Jeffrey White denied Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on standing and other jurisdictional issues. 214 The court held
that Plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. The court reasoned that
to demonstrate standing in cases raising procedural issues, environmental
plaintiffs need not show that substantive environmental harm is immi-
nent,21 5 nor do the plaintiffs need to present proof that the challenged
federal project will have particular environmental effects. 216 Instead, the
"'asserted injury is that environmental consequences might be over-
looked' as a result of deficiencies in the government's analysis under
environmental statutes. '21 7 Consequently, the court held that the Plain-
tiffs only needed to demonstrate that "it is reasonably probable that the
challenged action will threaten their concrete interests. 21 8
The court reasoned that while the impact of greenhouse gas emis-
sions traceable to OPIC and Ex-Im supported projects was not known
with absolute certainty, the only uncertainty Plaintiffs had was with re-
spect to the severity of consequences, not whether there would be signifi-
cant consequences. Additionally, Plaintiffs presented evidence
demonstrating that projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im were directly
or indirectly responsible for one-third of the total carbon emissions from
the United States in 2003.219 The court noted that, Plaintiffs' evidence, if
true, further demonstrated that: 1) increased greenhouse gases are the
major factor that caused global warming in the twentieth century, 2)
global warming that has already occurred has had significant environ-
mental consequences, 3) continued increases in greenhouse gas emis-
sions would continue to increase global warming with consequent
ernment Agencies Charged with Illegally Funding Fossil Fuel Projects (last updated Mar. 22,
2005), at http://www.climatelawsuit.org/.
213 Id. (contains most of the legal documents pertaining to this suit, including the motions
for summary judgment and related documents).
214 Friends of the Earth, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23,
2005).
215 Id. (citing Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)).
216 Id. (citing Citizens for Better Forestry v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 341 F.3d
961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003)).
217 Id. at 971-72 (quoting Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346,
1355 (9th Cir. 1994)).
218 Id. (citing Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d 961, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2003)).
219 Id. at *3 (citing Decl. of Richard Heede, 14).
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widespread environmental impacts, 4) and that these impacts affected
and will continue to affect areas used and owned by Plaintiffs. 220
In cases asserting a procedural challenge, once a plaintiff establishes
an injury in fact, the causation and redressability standards are re-
laxed.221 The court rejected Defendants' arguments that the causation
was too attenuated, despite evidence demonstrating that generally, for the
large energy-related projects referenced in Plaintiffs' complaint, third
parties have already completed basic design and planning stages for the
projects before applying for financial support from Ex-Im or OPIC.222
The court also held that Plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated redres-
sability because, when a plaintiff asserts inadequacy of a government
agency's environmental studies, the court reasoned that it is sufficient to
show that the [agency's] decision could be influenced by the environ-
mental considerations that [the relevant public statute] requires an
agency to study. 223
Although the court ruled that Plaintiffs have standing and that the
climate change lawsuit may proceed, it did not decide whether the fed-
eral agencies must perform environmental assessments on projects they
fund that contribute to global greenhouse gas emissions. That issue is
likely to be litigated. Still, the decision marks the first time that a federal
court has granted standing for a lawsuit exclusively challenging the fed-
eral government's failure to evaluate how its actions contribute to cli-
mate change and how climate change impacts affect U.S. citizens. 22 4
4. Industry's Response to Climate Change Litigation
Industry has criticized the recent surge in climate change litigation,
maintaining that lawsuits are not a constructive means of dealing with
climate change. 225 For example, American Electric Power (AEP) de-
220 Id. (citing MacCracken Decl., q 6, 12-39; Deci. of Dr. Phillip Dustan, 4N 5-13; Decl.
of Randall L. Hayes, 5-17; Decl. of Brian Jeffrey Johnson, U 10-26; Decl. of Mark Andre,
5-14; Decl. of Carol D. Ellinghouse, 3-8).
221 Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).
222 Id. at *4 (citing Boyle Dec., 1 41; Declaration of Harvey Himberg, 19).
223 Id. (citing Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 975 (emphasis in original)).
224 Not long after this first victory for standing in the climate change context, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon held that environmental groups had standing to sue for
injuries that could result from Owens Coming Corporation's emission of HCFC 142b, a green-
house gas and ozone-depleting substance. See generally Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens
Coming Corp., No. 04-1727-JE, 2006 WL 1594130 (D. Or. June 8, 2006).
225 See Press Release, American Electric Power, American Electric Power Files Motion to
Dismiss C02 Lawsuits, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=
109&STORY=/www/story/09-30-2004/0002262423&EDATE=. AEP's chairman Michael
Morris stated, "Climate change is a global issue that cannot effectively be addressed by any
individual, company, industry, sector or country. Addressing climate change requires coordi-
nated and meaningful international action that included developing nations, not a lawsuit
against five companies that generate electricity." Id.
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scribed the suit filed against it as counterproductive since AEP is a
founding member of the Chicago Climate Exchange and has already
committed to cap and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by a cumulative
10% by 2006.226 In addition, AEP invests in carbon sequestration re-
search and offset projects.22 7 While this suit may not seem "fair" to AEP
as a good corporate citizen, it is an important step toward getting a
mandatory federal climate change program in place in the United States.
Ultimately, the best way to ensure the implementation of such a federal
mandatory program is for the politically influential players in the regu-
lated community to lobby Congress for such a program.
In one instance, industry has fought back. On December 7, 2004,
the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and some Central Valley car
dealers brought suit in the U.S. District Court in Fresno against the Cali-
fornia Air Resources Board's rules limiting carbon dioxide and other
GHGs from new automobiles. 228 The complaint alleges that the new
California rules pre-empt federal law regulating fuel economy
standards 229
B. PARALLELS TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND SUCCESS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS
Climate change litigation is probably a worthy investment of re-
sources. The early stages of the environmental citizen suit movement of
the 1970s and 1980s offer an illustrative analogy.
In the 1970s, environmental groups were successful with "deadline
suits" under federal environmental statutes.230 Though the outcomes of
these suits were often more symbolic than substantive, these court victo-
ries prompted state agencies to consider and regulate environmental con-
cerns more actively. 231 During the 1980s, successful environmental
citizen suits resulted in more substantive outcomes, such as injunctive
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. CV-F-04-6663 REC, 2005 WL
2709508 (E.D. Cal Oct., 20 2005); Bruce Geiselman, Automakers Sue California Over Emis-
sion Rule, WASTE NEWS, Dec. 20, 2004; International Automakers Seek to Block California
Action to Regulate Greenhouse Gases, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 3, 2005 (reporting that the Associa-
tion of International Automobile Manufacturers seeks to intervene in the lawsuit). For a dis-
cussion of California's plan, see infra Part II.
229 Id.
230 Deadline suits are suits against the Administrator of an agency to compel performance
of a non-discretionary duty by the deadline for such action as prescribed in that agency's
regulations. See, e.g., New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 632 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
231 See Daniel Riesel, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 1.06
(1997) (noting that environmental citizen suits prompted "an increased sensitivity to enforce-
ment by the various state environmental agencies").
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relief and significant penalty awards against major corporations. 232 Ulti-
mately, the looming prospect of environmental citizen suits improved
environmental management practices in the regulated community. 233
Climate change litigation may realize the success of environmental
citizen suits through a similar evolutionary process, depending on how
"success" is defined. Success is definable as either the likelihood of pre-
vailing in court or the likelihood of plaintiffs achieving their desired re-
sult. Environmental citizen suits seemed farfetched in the early 1970s,
but by the early 1980s, they had become institutionalized. 234 Climate
change legal theories may seem farfetched today, but the movement is
still in its formative stage, and if there are plaintiff-friendly outcomes in
the three major climate change suits pending in federal court in 2006,
these theories may become institutionalized. Moreover, the "better watch
out" message underlying climate change litigation has already reached
the private sector, as reflected in the proliferation of voluntary measures
to address climate change. 235
Like environmental citizen suit litigants, climate change litigation
plaintiffs may secure some relatively easy procedural victories in court,
such as in the OPIC/Ex-Im Bank case. The OPIC/Ex-Im Bank case is
like a deadline suit, and offers strategic advantages comparable to dead-
line suits. Like deadline suits, a victory in the OPIC/Ex-Im Bank case
would be symbolic at best, since it would not remedy the effects of cli-
mate change directly and would not force these agencies to withhold or
restrict funding of these projects or others like them.236 A ruling that
OPIC and Ex-Im Bank must comply with NEPA does, however, subject
these federal agencies to public scrutiny, which may prompt the agencies
to reconsider similar funding decisions in the future. More importantly,
success in this case could send the message that the "courthouse door is
open" to similar suits against federal agencies and the private sector.
Plaintiffs in climate change litigation also can advance their agenda by
publicizing the success of these victories, and use the success as leverage
to presuure the federal government to implement a mandatory federal
GHG emissions reduction program.
232 See JEFFREY G. MILLER & THE ENvTL. LAW INST.., CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE EN-
FORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 76-89 (1987) (discussing several cases in
the 1980's involving injunctive relief and civil penalties awarded in citizen suits actions under
federal environmental statutes). For more recent data and analysis of environmental citizen
suits within the past decade, see James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmen-
tal Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 1 (2003).
233 See Dean Hill Rivkin, Environmental Citizen Suits, Green Justice, available at http://
www.hellbenderpress.com/?a=88.
234 See MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS 1-9, 1-10 (1991).
235 See supra Part 11.
236 See supra notes 212 - 223 and accompanying text.
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If defending climate change litigation suits is to become the next
challenge for corporate counsel, plaintiffs must first overcome two
daunting obstacles. First, plaintiffs must allege proper environmental
standing, 237 which is already a significant hurdle in cases involving do-
mestic environmental statutes and international impacts. 238 Moreover,
climate change litigation faces an obstacle the citizen suits of the 1970s
and 1980s did not - the federal courts', and especially the Supreme
Court's, post-1990 "backlash" against finding standing in environmental
cases. 239 Second, without a rights-conferring legal mechanism like a cit-
izen suit provision, which obviates the need to satisfy the prudential con-
siderations of constitutional standing,240 climate change litigation may
not realize anything close to the success of environmental citizen suits.
CONCLUSION
Even with the Kyoto Protocol's entry into force, the international
community recognizes that further action is warranted to address the
sources and impacts of climate change. Despite such international re-
solve to regulate climate change aggressively, the United States has
failed to implement a mandatory program to regulate GHG emissions at
the federal level. Several initiatives have been introduced at the federal
level seeking to implement policies that will curb GHG emissions to a
level that will mitigate the impacts of climate change. As of this writing,
these efforts have not been enacted.
The ongoing attempts to encourage increased federal action to regu-
late climate change are not limited to legislation introduced into Con-
gress or propositions set forth by environmental organizations. In fact,
much of the current activity is taking place throughout the country in
individual states. Many states are implementing some form of regulatory
program addressing climate change. Many states, such as those featured
237 Plaintiffs must satisfy the Article III requirements of standing - injury, causation, and
redressability. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Prudential considerations, such as avoiding generalized grievances and asserting claims that
fall within the zone of interest to be protected, also must be satisfied. Id. at 474-75.
238 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (denying standing for
claim asserting harm to U.S. citizens' conservational and recreational interests in species that
were affected by U.S.-funded projects in foreign countries).
239 See generally Karin P. Sheldon, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The Supreme
Court's Slash and Burn Approach to Environmental Standing, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10031
(1993).
240 See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (Congress
may eliminate the prudential requirements of standing by legislation). See also A. Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFF. U. L.
REV. 881, 885 (1983) ("legal injury is by definition no more than the violation of a legal right;
and legal rights can be created by the legislature.")
KYOTO OR NOT, HERE WE COME
in Part II of this Article, are proactive and have already implemented a
variety of ambitious programs to curb GHG emissions.
Even more indicative of the need for a comprehensive federal pro-
gram on GHG emissions are the collaborative regional initiatives that
have developed throughout the United States. The willingness of states
to join together to bolster their effectiveness in mitigating climate change
indicates that the United States is ready to embrace a federal regulatory
mandate for climate change. Exactly what that regime will entail is un-
clear; however, flexibility will be an important feature in any federal
regime that would be implemented, given the wide range of mitigation
attempts currently underway throughout the country.
State, regional, and local climate change initiatives may be subject
to criticism, but in light of the current federal regime, such criticism may
be unduly harsh. Climate change regulation has become a top priority
throughout the United States despite the federal government's lack of
leadership on the issue. What began as small initiatives in various states
across the country has now evolved into collaborative efforts that will
likely achieve real GHG emissions cuts. Climate change policy in the
United States has developed a strong foundation at the regional, state,
and local levels. These sub-federal initiatives have laid the groundwork
for immediate and aggressive regulatory action at the federal level.
In the private sector, the federal government's self-policing regula-
tory approach to climate change has helped corporate leaders respond to
the financial and environmental threats associated with climate change.
Like the state, regional, and local climate change initiatives, these volun-
tary measures are likely to reduce industry's costs of compliance with
mandatory controls that may be implemented in the future, and will help
guide policymakers in shaping a future mandatory federal regulatory re-
gime. Given the scope and urgency of the climate change problem, how-
ever, these measures are only a starting point and need to evolve quickly
into more aggressive regulatory action.
Climate change litigation has become a potentially vital weapon to
encourage regulation at the federal level. Even if unsuccessful, these
climate change suits filed on behalf of states, cities, and nongovernmen-
tal organizations throughout the United States reveal that influential law
and policy makers are unwilling to merely wait for federal action on the
issue. More readily than the state, regional, local, and voluntary climate
change initiatives in place throughout the country, climate change litiga-
tion will likely be the weapon that will compel implementation of
mandatory federal climate change legislation in the near future.
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